State of Utah v. Bradford Dale Gettling : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2008
State of Utah v. Bradford Dale Gettling : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Margaret P. Lindsay; Counsel for Appellant.
Marian Decker; Assistant Attorney General; Mark L. Shurtleff; Utah Attorney General; Jeffery R.
Buhman; Utah County Attorney; Counsel for Appellee.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Gettling, No. 20080037 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2008).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/666
Case No. 20080037-SC 
IN THE 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
Bradford Dale Gettling, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Supplemental Brief of Appellee 
MARGARET P. LINDSAY 
775 West Center Street 
P.O. Box 1058 
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660 
Counsel for Appellant 
MARIAN DECKER (5688) 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
JEFFERY R. BUHMAN 
Utah County Attorney 
Counsel for Appellee 
Case No. 20080037-SC 
IN THE 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
Bradford Dale Gettling, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Supplemental Brief of Appellee 
MARGARET P. LINDSAY 
775 West Center Street 
P.O. Box 1058 
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660 
MARIAN DECKER (5688) 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
JEFFERY R. BUHMAN 
Utah County Attorney 
Counsel for Appellant Counsel for Appellee 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
ARGUMENT 
I. NEW YORK V. BELTON DOES NOT LIMIT ARIZONA V. GANT 
WHERE, AS HERE, THERE ARE UNSECURED PASSENGERS 1 
II. ARIZONA V. GANT IS A NEW RULE OF FOURTH AMENDMENT 
LAW THAT SHOULD NOT HAVE RETROACTIVE APPLICATION 6 
III. DEFENDANT'S POST-ARREST DETENTION WAS JUSTIFIED 
UNDER ARIZONA V. JOHNSON BECAUSE THERE WAS FURTHER 
NEED TO CONTROL THE SCENE UNTIL DEPUTY RADMALL 
COULD SAFELY RELEASE CHILDS' CAR TO AN AUTHORIZED 
DRIVER, OR OTHERWISE SECURE IT 11 
IV. DEFENDANT'S POST-ARREST DETENTION WAS JUSTIFIED 
UNDER ILLINOIS V. CABALLES BECAUSE THE DOG SNIFF DID 
NOT PROLONG THE TRAFFIC STOP BEYOND THE TIME 
REASONABLY REQUIRED TO COMPLETE IT 13 
CONCLUSION 16 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
FEDERAL CASES 
Arizona v. Gant, U.S. , 129 S.Ct. 1710 (2009) 2, 3,4,10 
Arizona v. Johnson, U.S. , 129 S.Ct. 781 (2009) 4,5,11,12 
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) 6 
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) 1 
Griffith v.Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987) 6,11 
Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006) 8 
Hugueley v. Dresden Police Department, 
469 F.Supp.2d 507 (W.D. Tenn. 2007) 15 
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) 8 
Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987) 8, 9,10 
Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997) 12,13 
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) 1,3,4 
Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357 (1998) 9 
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) 5 
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) 8 
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965) 7 
United States v. $404,905.00 in U.S. Currency, 182 F.3d 643 (8th Cir. 1999) 14 
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) 8 
United States v. Caiyenter, 406 F.3d 915 (7th Cir. 2005) 15 
United States v. Herrera Martinez, 354 F.3d 932 (8th Cir. 2004) 14 
ii 
United States v. Herring, U.S. , 129 S.Ct. 695 (2009) passim 
United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537 (1982) 6 
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) 8,9 
United States v. Martin, 411 F.3d 998 (8th Cir. 2005) 15 
United States v. Thornton, 541 U.S. 615 (2004) 10 
STATE CASES 
People v. Hoyos, 162 P.3d 528 (Cal. 2007) 12 
State v. Box, 73 P.3d 623 (Ariz. App. 2003) 14 
State v. De La Rosa, 657 N.W.2d 683 (S.D. 2003) 15 
State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196 (Utah 1995) 2,10 
State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985) 12 
State v. Robison, 2006 UT 65,147 P.3d 448 13,16 
State v. Wilkinson, 2008 UT App 395,197 P.3d 96 14 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 7.1(c) 
(4th ed. 2004 and Supp. 2008-2009) 10 
Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure § 9.3(f) 
(4th ed. 2004 and Supp. 2008-2009) 15 
i i i 
Case No. 20080037-SC 
IN THE 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
Bradford Dale Gettling, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Supplemental Brief of Appellee 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
NEW YORK V. BELTON DOES NOT LIMIT ARIZONA V. GANT 
WHERE, AS HERE, THERE ARE UNSECURED PASSENGERS. 
In New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), the United States Supreme Court 
held that "when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of 
an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the 
passenger compartment of that automobile." Id. at 460. Belton is based on "the 
generalization that articles inside the relatively narrow compass of the passenger 
compartment of an automobile are in fact generally, even if not inevitably, within 
'the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or 
evidentiary ite[m].'" Id. (quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969)). 
Relying on Belton here, the State argued that defendant, a passenger in a 
vehicle stopped for a traffic violation, was lawfully detained until all the lawful 
objectives of the stop were completed, including searching the passenger 
compartment incident to the driver's arrest. See Aple. Br. at 18-19 (citing Belton and 
State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1203 (Utah 1995) (recognizing Belton authorizes 
officers to search arrested person and "his or her vehicle")). The Court heard oral 
argument in this case, and a companion case, State v. Baker, Case No. 20080351-SC, 
on 3 March 2009. 
Since oral argument, the United States Supreme Court has issued Arizona v. 
Gant, U.S. , 129 S.Ct. 1710 (2009). Gant limits Belton and the authority of 
police officers to search the passenger compartment of a vehicle incident to the 
driver's arrest. Id. at 1714. Under Gant, officers may search a passenger 
compartment incident to the driver's arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching 
distance of the vehicle at the time of the search, or there is reason to believe that the 
vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest. Id. Here, the driver was secured in 
a patrol car before officers attempted to search the passenger compartment. See R81 
(a copy of the trial court's Ruling & Order is attached to the State's Brief of Appellee 
at Addendum A). And the officers on the scene had no reason to believe that the car 
contained evidence of the driver's suspended driving privilege. Therefore, neither 
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of Gant's stated justifications for searching the passenger compartment of a vehicle 
incident to the driver's arrest is present here. 
Before Gant, Belton allowed a search of the passenger compartment of the 
vehicle incident to the driver's arrest, regardless of whether the arrestee was 
secured. See Belton, 453 U.S. at 466,468 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (majority rests on 
" fiction . . . that the interior of a car is always within the immediate control of an 
arrestee who has recently been in the car/' and asserting that under majority 
approach, "the result would presumably be the same even if [the officer] had 
handcuffed Belton and his companions in the patrol car before placing them under 
arrest"); see also Gant, 129 S.Ct. at 1718,1719 (observing "Justice Brennan's reading of 
[Belton] has predominated," and that "[ujnder this broad reading of Belton, a vehicle 
search would be authorized incident to every arrest of a recent occupant 
notwithstanding that in most cases the vehicle's passenger compartment will not be 
within the arrestee's reach at the time of the search"). 
Although Gant limits Belton, Gant does not limit Beltonfs application here, 
because Gant is distinguishable on its facts. Unlike this case, Gant was the sole 
occupant of his vehicle. See Gant, 129 S.Ct. at 1715. Therefore, once Gant was 
secured in the back of a patrol car, there was no danger he would reach into his own 
car to grab a weapon or destroy evidence. Id. at 1719. Here, on the other hand, the 
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car in which defendant was a passenger had two other occupants, including the 
driver. See R81. And only the driver was arrested and secured. See R81-80. As 
pointed out by Justice Alito, "it is not uncommon for an officer to arrest some but 
not all of the occupants of a vehicle." Gant, 129 S.Ct. at 1731, n.2 (Alito, J., 
dissenting, joined by Roberts, CJ., Kennedy, J., & Breyer, J.). As further noted by 
Justice Alito, the Gant majority "does not address the question whether in such a 
situation a search of the passenger compartment may be justified on the ground that 
the occupants who are not arrested could gain access to the car and retrieve a 
weapon or destroy evidence/' Id. 
Accordingly, Gant does not limit Belton's application where, as here, there are 
unsecured passengers. Indeed, unsecured passengers present the same danger as an 
unsecured arrestee: one, or all of them, "could gain access to the car and retrieve a 
weapon or destroy evidence." Id. Officers thus remain authorized to search the 
passenger compartment of a vehicle incident to the driver's arrest, where, as here, 
there are unsecured passengers — regardless of whether the arrestee is secured. Cf. 
Belton, 453 U.S. at 460. Therefore, defendant's detention pending the search of the 
passenger compartment in this case—incident to the driver's arrest—was justified. 
Arizona v. Johnson, U.S. , 129 S.Ct. 781 (2009), issued after briefing was 
completed in this case, but before oral argument, further supports the lawfulness of 
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defendant's detention. In Johnson, the United States Supreme Court clarified that 
passengers are reasonably detained incident to a traffic stop "for the duration of the 
stop" or until "[officers] have no further need to control the scene, and inform the 
driver and passengers they are free to leave/' 129 S.Ct at 788 (citing Brendlin v. 
California, 551 U.S. 249, 258 (2007)). As explained, Belton still applies when 
unsecured passengers are present, even if the arrestee is secured. Officers were 
therefore authorized to search the passenger compartment of the vehicle incident to 
the driver's arrest here. It necessarily follows that the officers had "further need to 
control the scene," or to detain the unsecured passengers until the passenger 
compartment search could be safely concluded. Johnson, 129 S.Ct. at 788. Any other 
rule would unnecessarily jeopardize officer safety. The Fourth Amendment does 
not require this. See, e .g. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110 (1977) 
(recognizing "too plain for argument" public interest in officer safety "both 
legitimate and weighty"). 
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II. 
ARIZONA V. GANT IS A NEW RULE OF FOURTH AMENDMENT 
LAW THAT SHOULD NOT HAVE RETROACTIVE APPLICATION, 
Even assuming arguendo that Gant controls here, Gant constitutes a clear 
break with Belton, or a new rule of Fourth Amendment law, and should not 
therefore have retroactive application. 
In asserting that Gant should not apply retroactively here, the State recognizes 
that in Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987), the United States Supreme Court did 
away with the "'clear break7 exception to the general proposition that new rules 
governing criminal procedures should be retroactive to cases pending on direct 
review/' Id. at 326, 328. Under the clear break exception, "a new constitutional rule 
was not applied retroactively, even to cases on direct review, if the new rule 
explicitly overruled a past precedent of [the] Court, or disapproved a practice [the] 
Court had arguably sanctioned in prior cases, or overturned a longstanding practice 
that lower courts had uniformly approved/' Id. at 325 (citing United States v. 
Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 551 (1982)). 
In Griffith, the Supreme Court considered whether new rules regarding use of 
peremptory challenges imposed in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), applied "to 
litigation pending on direct state or federal review or not yet final when Batson was 
decided/' Griffith, 479 U.S. at 316. Although the new peremptory challenge rules 
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imposed in Batson constituted a clear break with Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 
(1965), the Supreme Court declined to except Batson from the general rule of 
retroactive application, holding instead that "a new rule for the conduct of criminal 
prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on 
direct review or not yet final, with no exception for cases in which the new rule 
constitutes a 'clear break' with the past." Id. at 328. In so holding, the Supreme 
Court emphasized that application of the clear break exception resulted 1) in case-
specific analysis that was inappropriate when deciding whether a new rule applied 
retroactively to cases pending on direct review, and 2) in the uneven administration 
of justice, because similarly situated defendants end up being treated dissimilarly. 
M a t 327. 
Because Griffith was a jury selection case, however, the Supreme Court did not 
there consider the ramifications of applying new rules of Fourth Amendment law 
retroactively. Where the remedy for a jury selection violation is a new trial, see id. at 
319, the remedy for a Fourth Amendment violation is suppression. See United States 
v. Herring, U.S. , 129 S.Ct. 695, 699 (2009) ("[0]ur decisions establish an 
exclusionary rule that, when applicable, forbids the use of improperly obtained 
evidence at trial"). "[The] judicially created [exclusionary] rule is 'designed to 
safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect/" not to 
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make the defendant whole. Id. (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338,348 
(1974)). 
Accordingly, the culpability of officer conduct must be considered when 
analyzing the applicability of the exclusionary rule in a given case. Id. (citing United 
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 n.4 (1984)). The exclusionary rule applies only to 
flagrant or deliberate Fourth Amendment violations, or "only if it can be said that 
the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged with 
knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional." Id. at 701 (quoting Illinois v. Krull, 
480 U.S. 340, 348-49 (1987)). "The fact that a Fourth Amendment violation 
occurred — i.e., that a search or arrest was unreasonable — does not necessarily mean 
that the exclusionary rule applies." Id. at 700 (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,223 
(1983)). Indeed, exclusion is a "'last resort/" not a "'first impulse/" Id. (quoting 
Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006)). Moreover, because the exclusionary 
rule is not an individual right, it is applied only when it will effectively "deter[ ] 
Fourth Amendment violations in the future." Id. (citing Calandra, 414 U.S. at 347-
355; Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976)). Finally, "the benefits of deterrence 
must outweigh the costs." Id. (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 910). The exclusionary rule 
should not therefore apply where it can provide only "marginal" or "incremental 
deterrence." Id. (quoting Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 
8 
357, 363 (1998) and Krull, 480 U.S. at 352-53). This is particularly true given the 
"'substantial societal costs'77 of the rule, i.e., "letting guilty and possibly dangerous 
defendants go free—something that 'offends basic concepts of the criminal justice 
system/" Id. at 700-01 (quoting Krull, 480 U.S. at 352-53 and Leon, 468 U.S. at 908). 
Where, as here, officers were, at the time, authorized by Belton to conduct a 
search of the passenger compartment incident to the driver's arrest, even if the 
arrestee was secured, the "officers did nothing improper." Herring, 129 S.Ct. at 700. 
Because there was no culpable conduct on the part of law enforcement officers when 
they acted here, "'the extreme sanction of exclusion'" is unjustified. Id. (quoting 
Leon, 468 U.S. at 916). This is true even if, in hindsight, a Fourth Amendment 
violation in fact occurred, given Gant's subsequent limitation of Belton. 
Indeed, in Herring, an officer relied on an arrest warrant that was 
subsequently found to have been recalled, but which recall did not appear in the 
computer database. Id. at 698. The Supreme Court acknowledged that a Fourth 
Amendment violation occurred, but declined to apply the exclusionary rule to what 
was at most a negligent failure to act, rather than a deliberate or tactical choice to 
act: "[T]his error is not enough by itself to require 'the extreme sanction of 
exclusion.'" Id. at 700 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 916). 
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If the exclusionary rule does not apply to negligent officer conduct like that at 
issue in Herring, it necessarily follows that it does not apply to non-culpable officer 
conduct like that at issue here. See Krull, 480 U.S. at 349-50 (declining to apply 
exclusionary rule to suppress fruits of warrantless administrative search performed 
in good-faith reliance on statute later declared unconstitutional). Indeed, before 
Gant, it was "widely accepted" that Belton authorized a search of the passenger 
compartment of the vehicle incident to the driver's arrest, regardless of whether the 
arrestee was secured. Gant, 129 S.Ct. at 1722, n. 11; see also United States v. Tliornton, 
541 U.S. 615, 628 (2004) (Scalia, J., with Ginsburg, J., concurring) (observing "cases 
involving this precise factual scenario — a motorist handcuffed and secured in the 
back of a squad car when the search takes place — are legion"); State v. Harmon, 910 
P.2d 1196,1203 (Utah 1995) ("[A]ny full custodial arrest, even for a misdemeanor 
traffic violation, allows an officer to conduct a highly intrusive search of the arrested 
person,. . . and his or her vehicle," [Belton], 453 U.S. [at] 460"); Wayne R. LaFave, 
Search and Seizure § 7.1(c), p.517, n.89 (4th ed. 2004 and Supp. 2008-2009) (collecting 
cases). 
Going forward, Gant instructs law enforcement officers as to the limits of a 
vehicle search incident to a driver's arrest, and violations of Gant will be subject to 
the exclusionary rule. But applying the exclusionary rule to officer conduct that was 
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lawful before Gant "overturned a longstanding practice that lower courts had 
uniformly approved/7 Griffith, 479 U.S. at 325, can have only marginal or 
incremental deterrent value, if any. Herring, 129 S.Ct. at 700. It should not therefore 
be applied here. 
III. 
DEFENDANTS POST-ARREST DETENTION WAS JUSTIFIED 
UNDER ARIZONA V. JOHNSON BECAUSE THERE WAS 
FURTHER NEED TO CONTROL THE SCENE UNTIL DEPUTY 
RADMALL COULD SAFELY RELEASE CHILDS' CAR TO AN 
AUTHORIZED DRIVER, OR OTHERWISE SECURE IT, 
Even assuming that Gant applies when there are unsecured passengers, and 
that Gant has retroactive application, defendant's detention while the passenger 
compartment was searched incident to the driver's arrest was nonetheless justified 
because neither he nor Childs could legally drive Childs7 car. There was, therefore, 
further need to control the scene until Childs' car could be safely released to an 
authorized driver, moved to a lawful temporary parking space, or impounded. 
As set forth in Point I, the United States Supreme Court clarified in Arizona 
v. Johnson, that passengers are reasonably detained incident to a traffic stop "for 
the duration of the stop" or until "[officers] have no further need to control the 
scene, and inform the driver and passengers they are free to leave." 129 S.Ct. at 
788 (citing California v. Brendlin, 551 U.S. 249,258 (2007)). In so clarifying, the 
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Supreme Court re-emphasized that "'"[t]he risk of harm to both the police and 
the occupants [of a stopped vehicle] is minimized,... if the officers routinely 
exercise unquestioned command of the situation."" Id. at 786 (quoting Maryland 
v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 414 (1997) (in turn quoting Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 
692, 702-03 (1981)) and citing Brendlin, 551 U.S. at 258) (second brackets in 
original). 
Here, there was further need to control the scene following the driver's arrest. 
Neither defendant nor Childs had a valid driver's license; therefore, neither of them 
could lawfully drive Childs' vehicle. See R81. Deputy Radmall was thus required to 
remain with Childs' car until he or another officer could safely drive it to a lawful 
temporary parking area, release it to an authorized driver, or impound it. Cf State v. 
Hygh, 711 P.2d 264,268-69 (Utah 1985) (recognizing where passenger had no valid 
license, impounding car without first allowing arrestee/owner to arrange for third-
party to move it, as per department policy, was unreasonable). Since Deputy 
Radmall would have to deal with Childs' car one way or another, there was 
necessarily "further need to control the scene," until he could do so safely. Johnson, 
129 S.Ct. at 788. Cf People v. Hoyos, 162 P.3d 528, 546 (Cal. 2007) (upholding 
detention of driver and passenger reasonably seized following Mimms/Wilson order 
to exit vehicle "at least as long as reasonably necessary for the officer to complete 
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the activity [an inventory search] iheMimms/Wilson order contemplates"). As noted 
in the State's opening brief, the important interest in officer safety is of special 
significance during traffic stops, which "may be dangerous encounters/' and even 
more so, when, as here, unsecured passengers are present. Aple. Br. at 10 (quoting 
Wilson, 519 U.S. at 413); see also Aple. Br. at 11-14 (collecting cases and pertinent 
statistics). 
In sum, the trial court's ruling may be upheld on the alternative ground that 
there was further need to control the scene, including detaining defendant, until 
Deputy Radmall could safely release the car to an authorized driver, secure it 
temporarily in a public parking space, or impound it. See State v. Robison, 2006 UT 
65, Tj 19, 147 P.3d 448 (recognizing appellate court may affirm judgment below 
where sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on record, even though 
such ground or theory not considered by lower court). 
IV. 
DEFENDANTS POST-ARREST DETENTION WAS JUSTIFIED 
UNDER ILLINOIS V. CABALLES BECAUSE THE DOG SNIFF DID 
NOT PROLONG THE TRAFFIC STOP BEYOND THE TIME 
REASONABLY REQUIRED TO COMPLETE IT. 
Finally, assuming arguendo that defendant's detention while the passenger 
compartment was searched incident to the driver's arrest was not justified under 
either Gant or Johnson, only a minute and a half elapsed between the driver's arrest 
13 
and the canine alert on the exterior of Childs' car. See Rl94:13,22-23 (A copy of the 
preliminary hearing transcript is attached to Aple. Br. at Addendum B). This slight 
delay was de minimis and did not, therefore, constitute a Fourth Amendment 
violation. 
In Illinois v. Caballes, the United States Supreme Court recognized that 
deploying a canine during a traffic stop is permissible so long as it does not 
prolong the traffic stop "beyond the time reasonably required'' to complete it. 
543 U.S. 405,407 (2005); accord State v. Wilkinson, 2008 UT App 395, Tf8; 197 P.3d 
96 (rejecting claim that "request for a canine unit unreasonably extended the 
duration of Wilkinson's detention") (emphasis in original). 
Here, extending the traffic stop a mere ninety seconds for a dog sniff falls well 
within the parameters of de minimis conduct. Even prior to Caballes, lower courts 
upheld suspicionless dog sniffs conducted, as here, at the conclusion of a traffic stop 
on the ground that the few additional minutes taken were de minimis. See, e.g., 
United States v. Herrera Martinez, 354 F.3d 932, 934 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding "short 
detention for dog sniff after completion of traffic stop [does not] violate Fourth 
Amendment"); United States v. $404,905.00 in U.S. Currency, 182 F.3d 643, 649 (8th 
Cir. 1999) (upholding thirty-second to two-minute suspicionless dog sniff conducted 
at conclusion of traffic stop); State v. Box, 73 P.3d 623, 630 (Ariz. App. 2003) 
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(upholding post-stop dog sniff on ground Box was "only slightly inconvenienced 
when he was further detained for less than a minute while the dog sniffed his 
vehicle"); State v. De La Rosa, 657 N. W.2d 683,687 (S.D. 2003) (holding post-stop dog 
sniff not unreasonable because "sniffing activity was of short duration/' or "a matter 
of seconds"); see also id. at n.3 (collecting pre-Caballes cases where courts upheld 
similarly de minimis suspicionless investigations). 
Since Caballes, courts continue to uphold similarly brief post-traffic stop 
canine sniffs. See United States v. Martin, 411 F.3d 998, 1002 (8th Cir. 2005) 
(upholding thirty seconds to two minute post-stop dog sniff); United States v. 
Caiyenter, 406 F.3d 915, 916-17 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding possible five-minute wait 
during routine traffic stop for drug-detection dog not unreasonable); Hugueley v. 
Dresden Police Department, 469 F.Supp.2d 507, 513 (W.D. Term. 2007) (upholding 
post-stop dog sniff that took no more than two and one-half minutes). As 
recognized by Professor LaFave, because dog sniffs take "so little time," courts are 
"willing to employ a 'fudge factor' regarding the temporal limits of the traffic stop; 
if the dog sniff is conducted immediately or soon after completion of those tasks 
actually connected with the traffic violation, the resulting additional custody is 
deemed so de minimis as to be of no consequence." Wayne R. LaFave, Search & 
Seizure § 9.3(f) at 399 & n.231 (4th ed. 2004 and Supp. 2008-2009) (collecting cases). 
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In sum, because defendant's detention after the driver's arrest and before the 
drug dog alerted on Childs' car was de minimis, no Fourth Amendment violation 
occurred here. The trial court's ruling may be upheld on this alternative ground. 
See Robison, 2006 UT 65, f 19. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted 28 May 2009. 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
MARIAN DECKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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